Why non-artists don't understand art?
category: general [glöplog]
i would really recommend not privately corresponding with ep, he's one scary mofo.
skrebbel: truly awesome! thanks to your definition the fringe on my bathroom doormat is more likely to be art than all michelangelo sculptures or gerhard richter paintings.
defining art as non-functional does not work since the "art" factor is a function of the object itself. also if this function only causes the price of the object to reach insane highs.
defining art as non-functional does not work since the "art" factor is a function of the object itself. also if this function only causes the price of the object to reach insane highs.
"Kunst ist was für Leute die nichts können."
you're all mostly hip, evidence-based, logical, reasoning people right?
top tip:
if you answered yes to the above, thinking and talking about art will drive you crazy
top tip:
if you answered yes to the above, thinking and talking about art will drive you crazy
Skepticism about the possibility and value of a definition of art has been an important part of the discussion in aesthetics since the 1950s on, and though its influence has subsided, uneasiness about the definitional project persists. (See section 4, below, and also Kivy, 1997, and Walton, 2007).
A common family of arguments, inspired by Wittgenstein's famous remarks about games (Wittgenstein, 1953), has it that the phenomena of art are, by their nature, too diverse to admit of the unification that a satisfactory definition strives for, or that a definition of art, were there to be such a thing, would exert a stifling influence on artistic creativity. One expression of this impulse is Weitz's Open Concept Argument: any concept is open if a case can be imagined which would call for some sort of decision on our part to extend the use of the concept to cover it, or to close the concept and invent a new one to deal with the new case; all open concepts are indefinable; and there are cases calling for a decision about whether to extend or close the concept of art. Hence art is indefinable. (Weitz, 1956) Against this it is claimed that change does not, in general, rule out the preservation of identity over time, that decisions about concept-expansion may be principled rather than capricious, and that nothing bars a definition of art from incorporating a novelty requirement.
A second sort of argument, less common today than in the heyday of a certain form of extreme Wittgensteinianism, urges that the concepts that make up the stuff of most definitions of art (expressiveness, form) are embedded in general philosophical theories which incorporate traditional metaphysics and epistemology. But since traditional metaphysics and epistemology are prime instances of language gone on conceptually confused holiday, definitions of art share in the conceptual confusions of traditional philosophy (Tilghman).
A third sort of argument, more historically inflected than the first, takes off from an influential study by the historian of philosophy Paul Kristeller, in which he argued that the modern system of the five major arts [painting, sculpture, architecture, poetry, and music] which underlies all modern aesthetics … is of comparatively recent origin and did not assume definite shape before the eighteenth century, although it had many ingredients which go back to classical, mediaeval, and Renaissance thought. Since that list of five arts is somewhat arbitrary, and since even those five do not share a single common nature, but rather are united, at best, only by several overlapping features, and since the number of art forms has increased since the eighteenth century, Kristeller's work may be taken to suggest that our concept of art differs from that of the eighteenth century. As a matter of historical fact, there simply is no stable definiendum for a definition of art to capture.
A fourth sort of argument suggests that a definition of art stating individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for a thing to be an artwork, is likely to be discoverable only if cognitive science makes it plausible to think that humans categorize things in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. But, the argument continues, cognitive science actually supports the view that the structure of concepts mirrors the way humans categorize things – which is with respect to their similarity to prototypes (or exemplars), and not in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. So the quest for a definition of art that states individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions is misguided and not likely to succeed. (Dean, 2003) Against this it has been urged that psychological theories of concepts like the prototype theory and its relatives can provide at best an account of how people in fact classify things, but not an account of correct classifications of extra-psychological phenomena, and that, even if relevant, prototype theory and other psychological theories of concepts are at present too controversial to draw substantive philosophical morals from.
A common family of arguments, inspired by Wittgenstein's famous remarks about games (Wittgenstein, 1953), has it that the phenomena of art are, by their nature, too diverse to admit of the unification that a satisfactory definition strives for, or that a definition of art, were there to be such a thing, would exert a stifling influence on artistic creativity. One expression of this impulse is Weitz's Open Concept Argument: any concept is open if a case can be imagined which would call for some sort of decision on our part to extend the use of the concept to cover it, or to close the concept and invent a new one to deal with the new case; all open concepts are indefinable; and there are cases calling for a decision about whether to extend or close the concept of art. Hence art is indefinable. (Weitz, 1956) Against this it is claimed that change does not, in general, rule out the preservation of identity over time, that decisions about concept-expansion may be principled rather than capricious, and that nothing bars a definition of art from incorporating a novelty requirement.
A second sort of argument, less common today than in the heyday of a certain form of extreme Wittgensteinianism, urges that the concepts that make up the stuff of most definitions of art (expressiveness, form) are embedded in general philosophical theories which incorporate traditional metaphysics and epistemology. But since traditional metaphysics and epistemology are prime instances of language gone on conceptually confused holiday, definitions of art share in the conceptual confusions of traditional philosophy (Tilghman).
A third sort of argument, more historically inflected than the first, takes off from an influential study by the historian of philosophy Paul Kristeller, in which he argued that the modern system of the five major arts [painting, sculpture, architecture, poetry, and music] which underlies all modern aesthetics … is of comparatively recent origin and did not assume definite shape before the eighteenth century, although it had many ingredients which go back to classical, mediaeval, and Renaissance thought. Since that list of five arts is somewhat arbitrary, and since even those five do not share a single common nature, but rather are united, at best, only by several overlapping features, and since the number of art forms has increased since the eighteenth century, Kristeller's work may be taken to suggest that our concept of art differs from that of the eighteenth century. As a matter of historical fact, there simply is no stable definiendum for a definition of art to capture.
A fourth sort of argument suggests that a definition of art stating individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for a thing to be an artwork, is likely to be discoverable only if cognitive science makes it plausible to think that humans categorize things in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. But, the argument continues, cognitive science actually supports the view that the structure of concepts mirrors the way humans categorize things – which is with respect to their similarity to prototypes (or exemplars), and not in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. So the quest for a definition of art that states individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions is misguided and not likely to succeed. (Dean, 2003) Against this it has been urged that psychological theories of concepts like the prototype theory and its relatives can provide at best an account of how people in fact classify things, but not an account of correct classifications of extra-psychological phenomena, and that, even if relevant, prototype theory and other psychological theories of concepts are at present too controversial to draw substantive philosophical morals from.
Skrebbel: while i like your definition, according to it, this thread is art!
It is. All the random copypasta, flaming, long-winded meta-definitions & pointless arguing must be worth _something_. :)
Copypasta sucks, it's just tubes of noodle in pasta packaging. It's probably art though.
Quote:
"Understanding what it takes to produce art" and "understanding art" are two completely different things btw.
I would more divide it in "producing art" (also producing is a term I don't find to be right in this case) and "feeling art". And both are quite connected I think.
But "Understanding" is quite arrogant in terms of art. Degas said "A painting requires a little mystery...some vagueness...and some fantasy. When you always make your meaning perfectly plain...you end up boring people.". Also you never can be sure you really know and understand what the artists wants to say unless he tells you.
Nowadays a lot of the "art" in the "arts scene" is made by reputation and connections...not by the actual art.
Just my opinion. ;)
repetitive art
Only for you !
annoying art
Only for you !
raven :)
:D ;)
kunst ist schön, macht aber viel arbeit
karl valentin rules
I have plenty of similar threads to submit.
"Why okkie doesn't understand sufjan stevens"
"Why metapat doesn't undertand the proper english accent"
"Why I accidentally the whole thing"
"Why jazz musicians don't leave children alone"
"Why okkie doesn't understand sufjan stevens"
"Why metapat doesn't undertand the proper english accent"
"Why I accidentally the whole thing"
"Why jazz musicians don't leave children alone"
Oh and "Why doesn't unicode and bbcode work on the oneliner"
Art is not about understanding.
sandwiches are not about ham
"Why okkie doesn't understand sufjan stevens"
that thread title is the complete opposite of this one, in fact
that thread title is the complete opposite of this one, in fact
Oh fuck, lets go back to Chimera.
Quote:
Every good painter paints what he is. (Jackson Pollock)
Nice to meet you, M. Pollock:
I've read that some Frenchies (Maupassant?) have attached a brush to the tail of a donkey and exposed the result. It looked like sh... err... abstract art!
that's not a jackson pollock.
